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HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?
TRACING ASSETS IN MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States spends a substantial amount of money on the long-
term care needs of its elderly.' Health insurance to cover these costs is
often inadequate or unaffordable to the average American.2 Consequently,
many elderly have sought eligibility under the Medicaid program as a
means to pay for these expenses. 3
Establishing eligibility for the Medicaid program is a rigorous process,
involving the interpretation and application of a set of complex rules.4 Al-
though obtaining eligibility may be difficult, Medicaid has become the
primary source for payment of nursing home care in this country. 5 In an
attempt to control the rising costs of Medicaid, 6 the federal government
enacted legislation in 1993 under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA).7 OBRA requires states to implement estate recovery programs in
order to receive federal financial support for their Medicaid programs.8
Under estate recovery programs, states recover the costs of Medicaid from
the estates of most recipients who were fifty-five or older when Medicaid
1. S. REP. No. 106-229(I), at 161 (2000). In 1995, the nation spent approximately $91 bil-
lion on the long-term care needs of its elderly. Id. Long-term care includes ongoing health,
social, and residential services required by individuals who are disabled or suffer from chronic
health conditions. Id. at 153-54.
2. Id.; Stephen Crystal et al., Out-of-Pocket Health Care Costs Among Older Americans
(Mar. 2000), available at http://ur.rutgers.edu/medrel/pocketcosts/pocketshort.html.
3. Kristin A. Reich, Long-Term Care Financing Crisis-Recent Federal and State Efforts to
Deter Asset Transfers as a Means to Gain Medicaid Eligibility, 74 N.D. L. REV. 383, 384 (1998).
4. Id. at 387; see generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid Eligibility
(May 23, 2002), available at http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/eligibility/criteria.asp (providing a
general overview of Medicaid eligibility criteria).
5. S. REP. No. 106-229(I), at 163; Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh
Away: In Pursuit of a Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery, 5 ELDER L.J. 359, 361-
62 (1997). On a national basis, Medicaid pays the costs of sixty percent of all nursing home bed
days. Zieger, supra, at 361-62.
6. Jo-Anne Herina Jeffreys, Estate Recovery of Medicaid Benefits, N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY.
NEWSPAPER, Apr. 13, 1998, at 835.
7. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 312,
627-28 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2000)).
8. Zieger, supra note 5, at 368.
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benefits were received. 9 The extent to which individual states have
implemented estate recovery programs varies significantly. 10
The purpose of this note is to provide a brief overview of the Medicaid
program, the estate recovery provisions under OBRA, and an analysis of
how these provisions are being implemented, with particular emphasis on
the North Dakota and Minnesota programs. This note will also address
whether refinement of existing law or alternative approaches to estate
recovery programs would better serve the interests of both Medicaid
recipients and society.
II. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
Medicaid is an entitlement program that pays the costs of health care
for qualified individuals and families that meet certain income and asset
requirements.]' Some of the services covered under Medicaid include
inpatient hospital care, physician services, laboratory and x-ray services,
and nursing home care. 12 Historically, the costs of the Medicaid program
have comprised the fastest growing segment of federal and state budgets.13
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE
Medicaid was established in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Securi-
ty Act and is funded by federal and state funds.14 Each state is responsible
for designing and administering its own Medicaid program 5 within the
parameters of federal guidelines.16 Although the Medicaid program is
supervised by a single state agency, the day-to-day operations of the
program may be delegated to city or county agencies. 17 The Medicaid
program is available to the public in North Dakota and Minnesota through
9. 42 U.S.C.§ 1396p(b)(1)(B).
10. See Charles P. Sabatino & Erica Wood, Medicaid Estate Recovery: A Survey of State
Programs and Practices (Sept. 1996), available at http://research.aarp.org/health/9615-
estate.html (summarizing the results of a study conducted by the AARP regarding the implemen-
tation of estate recovery programs in the states). As of 1996, "[sltate policies and procedures on
enforcement of estate recovery, use of liens, and points in time at which they provide notice and
information about estate recovery [varied] substantially from state to state." Id.
11. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, Medicaid: A Brief Summary (July 30, 2002), available
at http://cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/default4.asp.
12. Id. States have the option of including additional services in their state plans. Id.
Additional services may include prescription drugs, optometrist services, eyeglasses, physical
therapy, and rehabilitation services. Id.
13. S. REP. No. 105-36(I), at 117 (1997).
14. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, supra note 11; S. REP. No. 106-229(1), at 163 (2000).
15. S. REP. No. 106-229(I), at 163.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000) (defining the criteria that must be included in a state's
Medicaid plan).
17. Id. § 1396a(a)(5); Zieger, supra note 5, at 362.
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county offices that operate under the supervision of their respective state
offices. 18
B. BASIC ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Medicaid is a means-tested program that covers certain groups of
individuals if their income and assets are below specified limits. 19 Eligible
groups include individuals who are aged, blind, disabled, or under the age
of twenty-one; members of families with dependent children; and pregnant
women. 20 States are required to cover individuals that qualify as cate-
gorically needy,21 but have the option of including individuals that are
eligible under the optional categorically needy22 or medically needy
groups. 23 The medically needy group includes individuals whose income is
too high to qualify under the Medicaid guidelines, but who qualify none-
theless because their medical expenses exceed their income.24 Most nursing
home residents who qualify for Medicaid are eligible under the medically
needy group, 25 and this group will be the focus for the remainder of this
article.
Individuals who apply for Medicaid will have their assets evaluated to
determine if they are within allowable limits for the Medicaid program.
26
Countable assets under the North Dakota and Minnesota Medicaid
18. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-02(i)(b) (2001); Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., Health
Care: Minnesota's Health Care Programs, available at http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/healthcare/
asstprog/mhcap.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
19. S. REP. No. 106-229(l), at 165.
20. Id.
21. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, supra note 4. The categorically needy group
includes individuals who currently receive or qualify for the state's cash assistance program under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program or the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-05(1). This group also includes chil-
dren placed in foster care or subsidized adoption who meet the financial criteria of the AFDC
program. Id.
22. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, supra note 4. The optional categorically
needy group includes individuals under the age of twenty-one who are not receiving AFDC, but
who would meet the financial criteria for the program and children under the age of twenty-one
who are residing in adoptive homes or foster care. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-05(2).
23. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, supra note 4. The medically needy group
includes all other individuals who are within an approved category and whose assets are within
program limits, but whose income is too high to qualify under the categorically needy or optional
categorically needy groups. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-05(3). North Dakota also provides
eligibility under a fourth category with higher income limits for pregnant women and children. Id.
§ 75-02-02.1-05(4).
24. Gregory C. Larson & Melissa Hauer, Planning for Nursing Home Care in North Dakota,
74 N.D. L. REV. 191,201 (1998).
25. Id. "This is commonly the case with nursing home residents who may have, for instance,
an income of $2,000 per month but may pay $3,500 per month for their nursing care." Id.
26. Id. at 202.
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programs include real property, vehicles, cash, bank accounts, investments
in stocks and bonds, retirement accounts, annuities, life insurance, interests
in contracts for deed, and trusts. 27 Both North Dakota and Minnesota
exempt or exclude some assets when determining eligibility for Medicaid.28
The value of remaining assets must be within allowable limits in order to
qualify for the Medicaid program. 29
Once asset eligibility is attained, an applicant's income and medical
expenses are evaluated to determine if eligibility exists under the medically
needy category. 30 The applicant's income, after adjustment for certain
deductions,31 is compared with the applicant's medical expenses.32  If
countable income is less than the applicant's medical expenses, including
the cost of nursing home care, the applicant will qualify for Medicaid.33
C. NURSING HOME COSTS-A SPECIAL PROBLEM
Medicaid is the single largest payer of nursing home costs in the United
States. 34 Some perceive this as an unnecessary result of Medicaid estate
planning. 35 Medicaid estate planning is a process in which elderly
27. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-25 (stating that all available assets, if not otherwise
exempt or excluded, are counted in determining Medicaid eligibility); see also MDHS Health
Care Programs (Eligibility Manual) Chapter 0909, Assets, available at http://www.dhs.state.mn.
us/HealthCare/reportsmanuals/manualcounty/chapter09.htm#0909 (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (stat-
ing that "assets are things that people own, like bank accounts, stocks and bonds, cars and real
estate").
28. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 75-02-02.1-27 to -28; MDHS Health Care Programs, supra note
27. Some of the exempt or excluded assets under the North Dakota Medicaid program include the
home, if occupied by the Medicaid recipient or the recipient's spouse, one vehicle, burial funds up
to $3000 or burial items, furniture, clothing, and personal affects. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 75-02-
02.1-27 to -28.
29. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-26; MDHS Health Care Programs, supra note 27. In
North Dakota, asset limits are $3000 for an individual and $6000 for a married couple. N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-26. Special asset rules apply, however, for married couples when one
spouse is institutionalized and the other remains in the community. Id. § 75-02-02.1-24.
30. See generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, supra note 4.
31. N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 75-02-02.1-39 to -40. Deductions under North Dakota Medicaid
include sufficient income to maintain health insurance policies and a personal needs allowance.
Id. § 75-02-02.1-39(1). A single individual in the nursing home is permitted a personal needs
allowance of $50 per month. Id. § 75-02-02.1-40(l)(b)(2). Effective January 1, 2003, Medicaid
recipients who reside in the community are allowed a medically needy income level of $500 per
month for single individuals and $516 per month for married couples. N.D. DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FACTORS § 510-05-85-40(2) (2003). A married couple with one
spouse in the nursing home fares substantially better because of the increased income limits
allowed under the spousal impoverishment provisions. Id. § 510-05-65-20(1).
32. Larson & Hauer, supra note 24, at 201.
33. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-41.1(2).
34. S. REP. NO. 106-229(I), at 163-64 (2000).
35. In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (Minge, J. con-
curring specially) (stating that the only way to prevent "endless scheming" is to construe OBRA to
allow "any estate, interest, or arrangement" for estate recovery purposes); Federal Budget Process
NOTE
Americans plan to qualify for Medicaid by sheltering and divesting them-
selves of their assets, instead of depleting their assets on the cost of care.
36
These individuals artificially impoverish themselves in order to meet the
strict asset requirements of the program. 37 Thus, some individuals who
would not ordinarily qualify for Medicaid are obtaining eligibility through
the use of Medicaid planning, which is likely to increase the costs of the
program overall.
Although estate planning may play a part in the rising cost of Medi-
caid, the primary factor is most likely attributable to the aging of our
society. 38 Since 1900, the percentage of Americans over the age of sixty-
five has more than tripled, and this segment of the population has increased
eleven times.39 Additionally, the oldest living Americans are getting
older.40 In 2000, there were thirty-four times more Americans that were
age eighty-five or older than there were in 1900.41 The aging of America is
expected to continue and is anticipated to peak between 2010 and 2030,
when the baby boom generation reaches age sixty-five.4 2
Elderly Americans are particularly susceptible to chronic health con-
ditions that require ongoing medical attention and long-term care needs.
43
Approximately seventy-five percent of elderly Medicare recipients report at
least two chronic health conditions, the most common being arthritis and
hypertension.a4 Additionally, the incidence and cost of providing nursing
Restructuring: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Informa-
tion and Technology, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of David M. Mason, Vice President, Govern-
ment Relations, The Heritage Foundation). Mr. Mason stated, "The fastest growing portion of the
Medicaid program... is made up of the long-term costs of nursing care for the elderly 'poor.'
However, many middle-class seniors are simply divesting themselves of their assets and tech-
nically impoverishing themselves to become eligible for Medicaid's generous nursing home
payments." Id.
36. Reich, supra note 3, at 388.
37. Id. But cf S. REP No. 106-229(I), at 161 (indicating that spending for the elderly results
primarily from covering individuals who have become poor as a result of depleting their assets on
the cost of nursing home care).
38. Zieger, supra note 5, at 365-66.
39. Admin. on Aging, A Profile of Older Americans: 2001-The Older Population (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/stats/profile/2001/1 .html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Admin. on Aging, A Profile of Older Americans: 2001-Future Growth (Dec. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/stats/profile/2O0l/2.html. The baby boom generation is
the generation that will reach retirement age between the years 2010 and 2030. Id.
43. S. REP. No. 106-229(I), at 134 (2000).
44. Id.
2003]
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home care for those stricken with Alzheimer's disease is expected to
increase dramatically as Americans become older.4 5
Nursing home costs account for approximately seventy percent of all
expenditures for long-term care services.46 Although many Americans be-
lieve that Medicare or their private health insurance policy will cover the
cost of nursing home care,47 statistics show that most private spending for
the cost of nursing home care comes out of consumers' pockets. 48 This
seems to indicate that either consumers are choosing not to purchase long-
term care insurance, or the cost of insurance is prohibitive.
An individual in a nursing home can expect to pay between $35,000
and $60,000 each year for the cost of care.49 Without the assistance of an
adequate long-term care policy, even middle and upper-middle class fami-
lies are unable to cover the cost.50 Consequently, many Americans are
forced to rely on Medicaid to cover the costs of their long-term care
medical needs.5'
D. SPOUSAL IMPOVERISHMENT PROVISIONS
In 1988, Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
(MCCA).52 The goal of the MCCA was to address the financial difficulties
that the Medicaid program imposed on individuals who continued to reside
in the community after their spouses entered a nursing facility on a perma-
nent basis. 53 Before the MCCA, community spouses were required to
spend most of their income and assets on the cost of care for their institu-
tionalized spouses, and were left with little or no means to provide for
themselves.54 By enacting the MCCA, Congress dramatically increased the
45. Id. Statistics gathered by the National Institute on Aging and reported to the Senate
indicate as many as four million people and approximately half of elderly individuals over the age
of eighty-five in the United States have symptoms of Alzheimer's disease. Id. at 134-35.
46. Id. at 161.
47. Id. at 153. "Too often it is only when a family member becomes disabled that they learn
that these expenses will have to be paid for out-of-pocket. Furthermore, individuals whose long-
term care needs arise as a result of a sudden onset of a stroke or other illness do not have adequate
time to plan." Id.
48. Id. at 161. Less than one percent of total spending for nursing home care in 1995 was
paid for by private insurance. Id.
49. Id. at 153. Those individuals choosing home care do not fare much better, with the cost
of comparable home care ranging from $35 to $100 a day. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Medicaid is becoming the "primary payer" of nursing home care in this country. Id.
52. Id. at 167.
53. Id.




asset and income limits that the community spouse could have and still
qualify the institutionalized spouse for Medicaid.55
III. ESTATE RECOVERY
The aging of America, Medicaid planning, and the special spousal
protections under the MCCA have all likely contributed to the increased
costs of nursing home care under Medicaid. In response to the escalating
costs of the Medicaid program, the federal government enacted mandatory
estate recovery under OBRA.56 OBRA requires states to recover the cost of
Medicaid benefits received from the estates of individuals who were fifty-
five or older when the benefits were received.57
A. AN OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since 1965, federal regulation has enabled states to recover the cost of
Medicaid benefits. 58 Nonetheless, prior to OBRA, only twenty-eight states
had estate recovery programs in place.59 Estate recovery is accomplished
by using liens or by recovering from the recipient's estate. 60 Both North
Dakota and Minnesota have well-established programs that focus on
recovering from recipients' estates. 61
Upon the death of any individual, the personal representative is re-
quired to serve a copy of the petition or application commencing probate to
the Department of Human Services (DHS).62 This notice enables the DHS
to check its records to determine if Medicaid benefits have been paid and
estate recovery measures should be pursued against the heirs of the estate. 63
55. Larson & Hauer, supra note 24, at 203; 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5 (2000). In 2003, the com-
munity spouse asset limit increased from $89,280 to $90,660. N.D. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 31, § 510-05-65-20(1). Moreover, the community spouse is permitted to have any
additional amount transferred under a court order or established through a fair hearing. Id.
Additionally, community spouses are now allowed to keep up to $2267 of marital income each
month before they are required to contribute to the cost of nursing home care for their
institutionalized spouses. Id. Specific spousal provisions permit the community spouse to petition
for an increase in the community spouse income limit on the basis of hardship. Id.




60. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 433.36 (2000).
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15 (West Supp.
2003).
62. Larson & Hauer, supra note 24, at 210-11.
63. Id.
NOTE
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B. OBRA CHANGES
The OBRA amendment of 1993 changed Medicaid estate recovery
in three fundamental ways.64 First, it made estate recovery programs man-
datory. 65 Second, it lowered the age at which estate recovery claims attach
from sixty-five to fifty-five.66 Finally, OBRA provided a definition of
"estate" that permitted states to expand recovery beyond the traditional pro-
bate estate.67 States that choose to define "estate" as the probate estate
exempt substantially more assets than do states with the broader definition
now permitted under OBRA.68
The probate estate does not include certain property that is said to pass
outside of the estate.69 Property interests that pass outside of the probate
estate include joint property interests, life estate interests, property that
passes by way of survivorship, payable-on-death provisions, life insurance,
and beneficial interests in trusts. 70 Under OBRA, states may define "estate"
as the probate estate, or may expand the definition to include property that
the decedent had an interest in and that passed to others outside of the
probate estate.7 1 Thus, states now have the option of implementing a broad-
based estate recovery, depending upon how they choose to define the
"estate." 72
C. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY
1. Federal Law
The federal statute governing the implementation of estate recovery
programs in the states is 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).73 The pertinent section of
this statute states "the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any
64. Zieger, supra note 5, at 367; Daniel G. Fish & Mary E. WanderPolo, Medicaid's Right of
Recovery Against Estates Under OBRA, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1994, at 1.
65. Zieger, supra note 5, at 367.
66. Id. at 368.
67. Id.
68. Dana E. Bookbinder, Medicaid Estate Liens and Your Chance to Avoid Them, N.J. LAW.,
THE MAGAZINE, Apr. 2002, at 33, 34. Even before OBRA, some states chose to define "estate"
more broadly by relying on a letter issued by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).
Citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1989). According to this letter,
states were not precluded from considering property that passed by operation of survivorship
under joint tenancy to be part of the deceased's estate for purposes of recovering under Medicaid.
Id.
69. FREDERICK K. HOOPs ET AL., FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE § 1:4 (4th ed. 2000).
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2000).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 1396p(b).
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medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual ... who was 55
years of age or older when the individual received such medical
assistance." 74
2. State Law
The revised OBRA language was incorporated into North Dakota law
at section 50-24.1-07 of the North Dakota Century Code.75 The pertinent
language of the North Dakota estate recovery statute states:
On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-
five years of age or older when the recipient received the assis-
tance, and on the death of the [recipient's] spouse ... the total
amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient...
must be allowed as a preferred claim against the decedent's
estate.76
Minnesota's Medicaid estate recovery statute is found at section 256B.15 of
the Minnesota Statutes and states:
If a person receives any medical assistance .... on the person's
death, if single, or on the death of the survivor .... the total
amount paid for medical assistance ... shall be filed as a claim
against the estate of the person or the estate of the surviving
spouse .... A claim must be filed if medical assistance was
rendered... under one of the following circumstances: the person
was over 55 years of age ... [or] the person resided in a medical
institution for six months or longer ... [and] could not have
reasonably been expected to be discharged. 77
Thus, under most circumstances in North Dakota and Minnesota, the
state may recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits from the estates of
recipients who were over the age of fifty-five when the benefits were
received. 78 However, there are instances when recovery of correctly paid
Medicaid benefits may be delayed or prohibited. 79
74. Id. § 1396p(b)(1).
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07 (1999).
76. Id. The statute does permit, however, payment of certain expenses before estate recovery
occurs. Id. § 50-24.1-07(1). These expenses include funeral expenses not to exceed $3000,
expenses of last illness, expenses of administering the estate, and certain claims against the estate
by the human service centers or the state hospital. Id.
77. MINN. STAT. § 256B.15 (1998).
78. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2).
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
D. CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN RECOVERY MAY BE DELAYED OR
PROHIBITED
1. Medicaid Expended Prior to OBRA
One issue in Medicaid estate recovery is whether recovery can occur
for benefits that were expended prior to enactment of OBRA. This issue
was addressed in Estate of Wood v. Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices,80 a 1995 case from Arkansas. 8 1 In Wood, Arkansas had enacted a
statute containing OBRA provisions that became effective on August 15,
1993.82 Wood received Medicaid benefits for payment of nursing home
costs from December 26, 1991, until her death on October 4, 1993.83 The
Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) filed a claim against
Wood's estate for the total amount of Medicaid expended for her nursing
home care, including payments made prior to the state's enactment of the
OBRA provisions. 84 On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized a
presumption that all legislation is intended to apply prospectively unless it
is remedial or expressly provides for retroactive application. 85 The court
ultimately found that the Arkansas law was not remedial and could not be
applied retroactively because it granted a new legal right to the ADHS and
affected a vested interest in Wood.86 Prior to OBRA's enactment, Wood
"had no reason to consider the Medicaid payments as anything other than
an outright entitlement." 87 The court held that the state could not recover
Medicaid benefits paid prior to the effective date of the OBRA provisions. 88
In In re Estate of Thompson,89 North Dakota took an inapposite ap-
proach. 90 In Thompson, the North Dakota Department of Human Services
(NDDHS) attempted to recover for the cost of nursing home benefits
expended on behalf of a Medicaid recipient during 1991 and 1992 based
upon the provisions of the post-1995 state statute that permitted an
80. 894 S.W.2d 573 (Ark. 1995).




85. Id. at 575 (citing Chism v. Phelps, 311 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Ark. 1958)). Remedial statutes
are those that do not disturb a vested right or create a new obligation. Id.
86. Id. at 575-76; see also In re Estate of Burns, 928 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wash. 1997)
(agreeing with the rationale of the Arkansas Supreme Court).
87. Estate of Wood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 894 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Ark. 1995).
88. Id.
89. 1998 ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847.
90. Thompson, T 16, 586 N.W.2d at 852.
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expanded definition of the recoverable estate. 9' The estate argued that this
was an inappropriate retroactive application of the post-1995 statutory pro-
visions. 92 The court, however, stated that a statute is not to be applied retro-
actively simply "because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation or
because part of the requisites of its action is drawn from time antecedent to
its passing." 93
2. Surviving Spouse
Another issue is whether OBRA authorizes states to recover from the
estates of surviving spouses for Medicaid benefits that have been correctly
expended on behalf of their spouses. The federal statutory language at issue
states, "No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid
on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery ... in the case of the following
individuals." 94 The federal statute then lists several exceptions where estate
recovery is permissible. 95 Because recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse is not one of the listed exceptions, this provision could be
interpreted as prohibiting recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse.96
In In re Estate of Budney,97 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found this
interpretation persuasive. 98 The court interpreted OBRA as prohibiting es-
tate recovery for Medicaid benefits that were correctly paid when recovery
efforts are directed at the estate of the surviving spouse. 99 According to the
court, OBRA provides a general prohibition against estate recovery for
benefits that were correctly paid.lOO This general prohibition is modified by
several statutory exceptions.lOl Because recovery against the estate of a
surviving spouse is not one of the listed exceptions, the court held that the
state could not recover from the surviving spouse's estate. 102 Consequently,
91. Id. 2-3, 586 N.W.2d at 848.
92. Id. 16, 586 N.W.2d at 851-52.
93. Id. (citing Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 35 v. Cass County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 123 N.W.2d
37, 40 (N.D. 1963)). The court stated that although the obligation to repay the Medicaid benefits
arose when the recipient received them, the NDDHS could only apply the 1995 version of the
statute to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
98. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2000).
101. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246.
102. Id.
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the court found that the Wisconsin statute was invalid because it exceeded
the authority granted under OBRA. 103
Most courts, including those in North Dakota and Minnesota, have
interpreted OBRA as allowing recovery from the estate of the surviving
spouse.104 However, even when recovery from the estate of the surviving
spouse is permitted, it may not occur until after the surviving spouse's
death.OS In Thompson, an elderly couple received Medicaid benefits to
assist in paying the husband's nursing home costs. 106 After receiving Medi-
caid benefits exceeding $50,000, the husband passed away.107 His wife
passed away three years later, and the NDDHS filed a claim against her es-
tate for the Medicaid received on her husband's behalf.108 After the district
court granted the Department's claim against the estate, the personal
representative appealed.109
On appeal, the personal representative argued that the state was unable
to recover for Medicaid expended because the plain meaning of OBRA
prohibited states from recovering from the estate of the deceased recipient's
surviving spouse.110 As in Budney, the personal representative contended
that OBRA contained a "general blanket prohibition" on the recovery of
correctly paid Medicaid benefits, which were recoverable only under certain
specified statutory exceptions.'' Because recovery from the estate of a
surviving spouse is not listed as an exception, the estate argued that the
NDDHS was prohibited from recovering.11 2 The North Dakota Supreme
Court rejected this argument and stated that OBRA must be evaluated in its
entirety and that the estate's interpretation failed to consider the "broad
definition" of "estate" that was now permissible under OBRA.113 This
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); In re
Estate of Thompson, 1998 ND 226, 15, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (stating "[any adjustment or recovery... may be made
only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse"). North Dakota's statute states "[n]o
claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent's surviving spouse." N.D. CENT. CODE §
50-24.1-07 (1999). Minnesota's statute states "[i]f a person receives any medical assistance
hereunder, on the person's death, if single, or on the death of the survivor of a married couple...
the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered ... shall be filed as a claim against the
estate." MINN. STAT. § 256B.15 (1998).





111. Id. T 11, 586 N.W.2d at 850; In re Estate of Budney, 541 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995).




broad definition, according to the court, gave states the option to interpret
"estate" to include assets that were conveyed to a survivor through "joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other
arrangement."l"4 Thus, if a Medicaid recipient had assets that were con-
veyed to his or her spouse by any of these means, the assets would be
recoverable for the Medicaid expenses incurred on behalf of the recipient as
long as they were in the surviving spouse's estate at death.15 This is so as
long as the state attempts recovery only after the death of the surviving
spouse. "16
In In re Estate of Jobe,'17 the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied a
similar rationale.'l 8 Here, recovery was sought for Medicaid benefits paid
on behalf of a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse." 9
The sole asset in the surviving spouse's estate was a homestead that had
been jointly owned during the couple's marriage and which was conveyed
to the surviving spouse upon her husband's death.120 The Minnesota Court
of Appeals found that acceptance of the estate's narrow interpretation
would render portions of the OBRA provision meaningless, particularly the
phrase "conveyed to a survivor ... through joint tenancy."' 2' The court
reasoned that the primary goal of statutory construction is to avoid inter-
preting statutes so that any portion is rendered superfluous.122 Because the
state attempted to recover the homestead only after the death of the sur-
viving spouse and the surviving spouse received the property from the
Medicaid recipient, the court held that the homestead property was
recoverable. 123
3. Community Spouse Dies First
A further complication in estate recovery occurs when the recipient
spouse outlives the community spouse. In Redfield v. Bitterman,124 the
North Dakota Supreme Court explored the extent to which the state can re-
cover from a community spouse's estate when the community spouse
114. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000)).
115. Id.
116. Id. 10, 586 N.W.2d at 849 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)).
117. 590 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
118. Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 165.
119. Id. at 164.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 166 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 2000 ND 217, 620 N.W.2d 570.
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predeceases the recipient spouse. 125 In Redfield, the community spouse
purchased certificates of deposit in 1992 and 1993 that were payable on
death to her three children. 2 6 Her spouse began receiving medical assis-
tance in 1995 to assist with the costs of his nursing home care.127 The com-
munity spouse passed away in July 1997, and the recipient passed away in
November of the same year. 2 8 The NDDHS sought a judgment from the
community spouse's estate against all assets with a right of survivorship or
payable on death designation to which the community spouse was bene-
ficially entitled at her death.129 The assets pursued by the NDDHS included
the certificates of deposit.130 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
the language of OBRA indicated "a legislative intent to limit the recovery
after the death of a recipient's spouse to cases in which a recipient is
survived by a spouse."131 To find otherwise would have resulted in the es-
tate of the community spouse remaining open until the death of her spouse,
who continued to receive medical assistance for his nursing home care.132
4. Surviving Child Under Twenty-One or a Disabled Child
The next area of contention involves language in OBRA that states
"[a]ny adjustment or recovery... may be made.., only at a time when he
has no surviving child who is under age 21, or [who] ... is blind or perma-
nently and totally disabled."133 OBRA is not clear regarding whether this
provision prohibits estate recovery permanently or only delays recovery
when a child was under twenty-one or disabled when the recipient received
125. Redfield, 5, 620 N.W.2d at 572.
126. Id. T 2, 620 N.W.2d at 571.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. 5 4, 620 N.W.2d at 572.
130. Id.
131. Id. T 12, 620 N.W.2d at 575. In particular, the court noted that the language of OBRA
authorizing recovery "on the death of the spouse of the deceased recipient" and prohibiting claims
"during the lifetime of the decedent's surviving spouse" indicated legislative intent to limit
recovery to those instances where the recipient is survived by a spouse. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-24.1-07 (1999)).
132. Id. The NDDHS was successful in convincing the court to remand on whether the
recipient spouse was entitled to an exempt property or family allowance from the estate of the
community spouse. Id. T 14, 620 N.W.2d at 576. The NDDHS conceded that it was not entitled
to claim an elective share on behalf of the recipient spouse because an election was not made prior
to his death. Id. T 13, 620 N.W.2d at 575. It remains unclear whether a Medicaid recipient is
required to claim an elective share from a spouse's estate. In a 1995 case, a Pennsylvania court
permitted a guardian to make an election on behalf of his ward because the failure to do so could
have compromised his ongoing Medicaid benefits. Estate of Wyinegar, 711 A.2d 492, 495 (Pa.
1998).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)(A) (2000).
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Medicaid.134 Additionally, OBRA does not clarify how this provision
should be applied when some of the recipient's children are disabled or
under twenty-one and some are not. 135
In In re Estate of Hooey,136 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated in
dicta that the obligation to repay Medicaid benefits arises upon the receipt
of the benefits.137 The fact that the Medicaid recipient may have a disabled
child or a child under age twenty-one only affects the timing of recovery,
not the ability to recover.13 8 Thus, if a Medicaid recipient had a minor child
or a disabled child, it appears that North Dakota would simply delay re-
covery efforts until the child attained the age of majority or upon the death
of the disabled child.
Another difficulty occurs when a Medicaid recipient is survived by
some children who are disabled or under age twenty-one and some who are
not. In In re Estate of Andrews, 139 New York attempted to recover
$8284.78 in Medicaid benefits it provided to Andrews.140 Andrews died
leaving a daughter and a legally adopted son who was permanently and
totally disabled.141 Although New York recognized that it could not re-
cover from the portion of the estate left to the disabled son, it attempted
recovery from the assets that had been distributed to the daughter.142 The
court found that the plain language of OBRA precluded recovery from the
estate of a recipient who is survived by a permanently and totally disabled
child, and that this protection included recovery from the entire estate, not
just the share received by the disabled child. 143
California addressed this problem by implementing a "proportionate
share" system for the recovery of Medicaid benefits.144 Under this system,
the state could purportedly seek to recover from the portion of the estate
devised to surviving non-disabled children as long as it left the disabled
child's portion untouched. 145 In Dalzin v. Belshe,146 California attempted to
impose its proportionate recovery system on the families of two deceased
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 521 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1994).
137. Hooey, 521 N.W.2d at 87.
138. Id. at 86.
139. 650 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
140. Andrews, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 471.
143. Id.
144. Dalzin v. Belshe, 993 F. Supp. 732, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
145. Id.
146. 993 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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Medicaid recipients. 47 The plaintiffs claimed that the proportionate share
system violated federal law and sought a declaratory judgment for injunc-
tive relief.148 California argued that the proportionate share recovery sys-
tem was valid because it did not violate the broad purpose of OBRA, which
enabled states to implement estate recovery programs. 149 The court re-
sponded that the state could not invoke the broad purpose of a statute when
the effect was to invalidate specific provisions within the statute.
150
Although the specific provisions were enacted to protect the inheritances of
disabled children, Congress may well have intended to protect the siblings
of disabled heirs from recovery as well.151 By doing so, these heirs are
better able to care for their disabled siblings in the future. 52 The court
found that California's proportionate share recovery system ran "counter to
the purpose of the federal law," and granted a permanent injunction to the
plaintiffs. 153
5. Hardship Provision
Another uncertainty is the extent to which states are required to forego
estate recovery completely under OBRA's hardship provision. OBRA
states that "[t]he State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with
standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive
the application of this subsection.., if such application would work an
undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria established by the
Secretary."1 54
In In re Estate of Cox,155 New York pursued recovery from a Medicaid
recipient who had received benefits in 1994 and 1995 to assist with the
costs of nursing home care.156 The executrix of the recipient's estate con-
tested the state's claim on the basis that the state failed to develop criteria
147. Dalzin, 993 F. Supp. at 733. Larson, one Medicaid recipient, died in 1994 and left her
entire estate to her two sons, one of whom suffered from mental retardation. Id. Longshare died
in 1995 and left her estate to her four children equally; two children suffered from multiple
sclerosis. Id. In both cases, California sought recovery from the portion of the estate devised to
the non-disabled children. Id.
148. Id.




153. Id. at 736. The court stated that a parent is likely to leave a greater portion of the estate
to a non-disabled sibling not only because the disabled sibling is incapable of managing the
property, but because the non-disabled sibling is expected to provide financially for the disabled
sibling in the future. Id. at 735.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3) (2000).
155. 687 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. 1999).
156. Cox, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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and a procedure to waive recovery in the case of an undue hardship.157 In
fact, the State Medicaid Manual published by the federal Medicaid agency,
Federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), stated that the
legislative history "requires that special consideration be given in cases
where the estate subject to recovery is 1) the sole income producing asset of
the survivors, 2) a homestead of modest value, or 3) other compelling cir-
cumstances exist."158 Although HCFA did not mandate states to include
these situations as examples of undue hardship, it did suggest that states
should consider these examples as situations that could constitute an undue
hardship1 59 This same HCFA manual required states to adopt procedures
to enable individuals to apply for the hardship waiver. 160 Although New
York had not yet adopted a policy that defined undue hardship, the state
statute did refer to "criteria established by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services." 161 The court found that this
reference, along with a failure to adopt its own regulations defining undue
hardship, meant that the state intended to follow the HCFA regulations, and
therefore, had established guidelines to follow in deciding claims of undue
hardship. 162
An administrative appeals case from South Carolina appears to support
the finding in Cox that a state may narrow the scope of the undue hardship
waiver by defining the specific circumstances when a hardship waiver will
be granted. 63 In Estate of Townsend,164 a claim was filed against the estate
of Townsend, a Medicaid recipient who received benefits to pay for his
nursing home costs. 165 Townsend's adult son filed a request for an undue
hardship waiver in an attempt to keep the family home. 166 South Carolina
had statutorily defined specific instances in which the undue hardship
waiver could be granted. 67 One instance stated that the state would forego
recovery of the decedent's home property if the decedent could have
transferred the home on or after the date of his or her Medicaid application
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 595-96.
160. Id. at 596.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 597.
163. Estate of Townsend v. HHS, No. 01ALJ080494 (S.C. A.L.J. July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.law.sc.edu/alj/hhs8/010494.htm.
164. No. 01ALJ080494 (S.C. A.L.J. July 30, 2002), available at http://www.law.sc.edu/alj/
hhs8/010494.htm.
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without incurring a penalty.168 Townsend's son claimed that he should
have been granted a hardship waiver because he had no home, because he
would have lived in the home if he had been allowed to, and because the
state's list of criteria was not exhaustive of all instances in which a finding
of undue hardship could be made.169 The administrative law judge found
that the specificity of the instances of undue hardship provided in the state
statute meant that the legislature intended to narrowly define when a finding
of undue hardship could be made.170 Consequently, the judge affirmed the
state's denial of the undue hardship waiver.171
However, defining specific instances that constitute an undue hardship
may be insufficient if a state does not go far enough. In Dalzin, the state
attempted to recover from the portion of a Medicaid recipient's estate that
was bequeathed to a non-disabled sibling, even though a disabled sibling
was still living.1 72 The state argued that there was existing state law de-
fining the situations which constituted an undue hardship, and because the
facts of Dalzin did not meet the criteria, the state could recover. 173 Ap-
parently, the state erroneously believed that the specific prohibitions against
estate recovery in OBRA, including recovery when the recipient is survived
by a disabled child or a child under the age of twenty-one, were optional
instances of undue hardship.174 The court disagreed and stated that Con-
gress intended the undue hardship provision to supplement, not supplant,
any waiver of estate recovery already permitted by OBRA.175 The court
made it clear that states are required to define and implement undue
hardship provisions above and beyond those specifically provided for by
OBRA. 176
The substance of the above three cases taken together seems to provide
the following guidelines relating to the undue hardship waiver provisions:
(1) a state is required to implement hardship waiver provisions, (2) these
hardship provisions supplement, but do not replace, the exceptions already
provided by OBRA, (3) a failure to define what constitutes an undue
168. Id. Under the state's Medicaid policy, the home could have been transferred without
penalty to a surviving child who had lived in the home for a period of at least two years im-
mediately before the decedent became institutionalized and who provided care that allowed the




172. Dalzin v. Belshe, 993 F. Supp. 732, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1997).






hardship may be interpreted as a state's willingness to follow the recom-
mendations provided by the HCFA, and (4) if a state has adequately defined
instances of undue hardship, these may be the only circumstances under
which an undue hardship will be granted by the state. 177
IV. MECHANICS OF ESTATE RECOVERY
Prior to the enactment of OBRA in 1993, the term "estate" remained
undefined in federal and state statutes.1 78 Consequently, courts generally
interpreted "estate" to mean the probate estate for those states that had
already implemented estate recovery measures.179 Since OBRA, states are
allowed to define "estate" expansively to include recovery of property that
previously passed outside of the probate estate. 180 This section will explore
how courts are applying this broader definition of "estate" in deciding the
extent to which the state can recover Medicaid expenditures from property
that passes outside of the probate estate.
A. DEFINITION OF ESTATE
OBRA mandates estate recovery from the estates of individuals who
received Medicaid benefits when they were fifty-five years of age or
older.181 This general requirement is modified by provisions that require
recovery to wait until after the death of the surviving spouse and until the
recipient has no surviving child under the age of twenty-one, or a blind or
disabled child.182 How aggressive a state chooses to be in implementing
estate recovery depends solely upon how it chooses to define the "estate"
from which recovery can occur. 183 According to OBRA, states "shall" de-
fine the estate for recovery purposes to include all property included in the
probate estate, but "may" also define estate to include property that passes
outside of the probate estate. 1 84
1. Probate Estate
OBRA requires the states to minimally define the estate for recovery
purposes as "all real and personal property and other assets included within
177. See supra Part III.D.5.
178. Zieger, supra note 5, at 370.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (2000).
182. Id. § 1396p(b)(2)(A).
183. Id. § 1396p(b)(4); Bookbinder, supra note 68, at 34.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).
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the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law."185
North Dakota defines the probate estate as "property, whether movable or
immovable, wherever situated, that would pass by intestate succession if the
decedent died without a valid wil1."186 Nonprobate property is property that
passes under an instrument other than a will and generally includes joint
property interests, life estate interests, property that passes by way of
survivorship or payable-on-death provisions, life insurance, and beneficial
interests in trusts. 187
2. "Estate" as a Term of Art
According to OBRA, states may choose to define "estate" more
broadly to include:
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a sur-
vivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust
or other arrangement. 88
The following demonstrates how courts are applying this broad definition
of "estate."
B. EXAMPLES OF ESTATE RECOVERY USING A BROAD DEFINITION OF
ESTATE
1. Joint Tenancy
Property owned in joint tenancy is property that is held by two or more
persons jointly, in undivided equal shares, with the right of survivorship.189
Upon the death of a co-tenant, the property automatically passes to the
remaining joint tenants. 190 Under OBRA's broad definition of estate, states
may recover "real and personal property.., including such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy."' 9' Thus, if a state has defined "estate" broadly, it appears that the
state can pursue property that a deceased Medicaid recipient owned in joint
185. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(A).
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(1)(a)(7) (1999).
187. HOOPS ET AL., supra note 69, § 1:4.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (7th ed. 1999).
190. Id.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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tenancy with another individual at death.192 Additionally, if the estate of a
surviving spouse includes property that was owned in joint tenancy with the
deceased Medicaid recipient, OBRA permits this property to be traced back
to the Medicaid recipient and recovered by the state for the cost of care. 193
Even before OBRA, California took an aggressive approach in its
Medicaid estate recovery efforts.194 In a case that seemed to foreshadow
the problems and implications of OBRA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Citizens Action League v. Kizer195 decided whether California's
definition of "estate" for recovery purposes could include jointly owned
property that passed to a survivor upon the death of the Medicaid recipi-
ent. 196 At the time Kizer was heard, the precursor to OBRA did not define
"estate."197 Nonetheless, California enacted a statute that permitted the
state to "claim against the estate of the decedent, or against any recipient of
the property of that decedent by distribution or survival."'198 In Kizer, a
group of affected citizens brought suit seeking an injunction to prevent
California from recovering property formerly held in joint tenancy with
Medicaid recipients that they received by right of survivorship.199 The
Ninth Circuit placed considerable emphasis on the fact that "estate" under
the common law did not include property formerly held in joint tenancy and
found that the California statute was impermissibly broad. 200
Recent cases, however, indicate that both North Dakota and Minnesota
will trace and pursue recovery from jointly held property that passes by way
of survivorship from a Medicaid recipient to a community spouse. 20' This
was the case in Jobe, in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the
state could recover jointly held property that passed to the deceased recipi-
ent's spouse. 202 Amos and Alice Jobe were a married couple who
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1989).
196. Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005.
197. Id. at 1006.
198. Id. at 1005 (quoting CAL. WEL. INST. CODE § 14009.5 (West Supp. 1989)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1008. The lower court had found in favor of the state after relying on a letter from
the Health Care Financing Administration. Id. at 1007. This letter indicated that states were not
required to define "estate" to mean the probate estate and that states would not be precluded from
considering property that passed by operation of survivorship as part of the recoverable estate. Id.
201. In re Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); In re Estate of
Thompson, 1998 ND 226, T 15, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Jobe,
stated that it was "persuaded" by the recent opinion rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court
in Thompson, concluding that Congress intended to allow states to trace assets of Medicaid
recipients. Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 165.
202. Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 166-67.
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purchased a 120-acre homestead in joint tenancy in 1974.203 Amos entered
the nursing home and began receiving Medicaid in 1993.204 He died in
1995, and the homestead passed to Alice by way of survivorship.205 Alice,
who never received Medicaid, died in 1996.206 The county filed a claim
against Alice's estate for approximately $60,000 in Medicaid benefits paid
on behalf of Amos.20 7 Recovery was sought against the homestead, the
only asset in Alice's estate, which was valued at approximately $35,000.208
The estate argued that the homestead was not recoverable because
Amos held no legal title or interest in it at the time of his death. 209 This
argument was based on the common law theory that an interest in property
owned in joint tenancy terminates at death and vests in the remaining joint
tenant.210 The court was not persuaded and found that recovery of jointly
held property from the survivor was entirely consistent with the broader
definition of "estate" now permissible under OBRA.211 More disturbing,
perhaps, was the fact that the court recognized as valid the provision of
Minnesota's statute that permitted recovery from "assets of the estate that
were marital property or jointly-owned property at any time during the
marriage."212 The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently found that this
provision of the Minnesota statute was impermissibly broad, and therefore,
preempted by OBRA.213 Nonetheless, Jobe demonstrates the aggressive
stance that Minnesota has taken in regards to Medicaid estate recovery.
2. Life Estates
A life estate interest is an interest in property that is measured by the
life of the party holding the estate or of some other person.214 Life estates
are commonly seen in the Medicaid context because they are excluded
assets under some Medicaid programs.2 5 Upon the death of the life tenant,
the property passes automatically to the remainderman outside of the






209. Id. at 166.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000)).
213. In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
214. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (7th ed. 1999). A remainder interest is a future interest
in the same property, so that upon the death of the life estate holder, the remainderman is entitled
to the property. Id. at 1294.
215. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-28 (1999).
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probate estate.216 Because the interest passes outside of the probate es-
tate, 217 this interest is not recoverable by those states that define "estate"
narrowly. 21
8
However, OBRA permits a broader recovery. 21 9 OBRA states that the
term estate "may include ... any other real and personal property...
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through ... life estate."220 Thus, OBRA appears to permit re-
covery of property interests that pass by way of a life estate as long as the
state has defined the recoverable estate broadly. 22'
In Bonta v. Burke,222 the California Court of Appeals addressed the
recovery of such an interest.223 In Bonta, the Medicaid recipient had con-
veyed the remainder interest in her home to her daughters in 1994, but
reserved both a life estate and the right to revoke the remainder at any
time.224 Because the remainder had been conveyed in 1994 and not at the
time of the Medicaid recipient's death, the lower court found that the
property did not pass by distribution or survival, such that the property
could be considered "estate" property, even under the broad definition of
"estate" adopted by California. 225 On appeal, the court held that the legis-
lature intended to reach assets that had not been irrevocably transferred to
beneficiaries, the recipient retained a significant interest in the property
until her death, and public policy considerations warranted recovery. 226
Based on these findings, the court permitted recovery from the property that
passed to the remainderman. 227
Whether the court would have reached the same conclusion if the
recipient had not retained the power to revoke the life estate remains un-
answered. 228 There is some indication that states are making headway in
defining when property formerly held as a life estate interest will be
subjected to estate recovery measures. 229
216. HOOPS ET AL., supra note 69, § 1:4.
217. Id.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2000).
219. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
223. Bonta, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 75.
226. Id. at 77.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Bookbinder, supra note 68, at 34. New Jersey exempts life estates created by deed, but
continues to pursue life estates created by wills. Id. New Jersey also exempts life interests in
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3. Survivorship Transfers
Survivorship or payable on death transfers occur when an individual
"becomes entitled to property by reason of surviving the death [of the
previous owner or co-owner]." 230 According to OBRA, the "estate," for
Medicaid recovery purposes, may include "such assets conveyed to a sur-
vivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through ... survivorship."23 1
An attempt to recover assets conveyed by the use of a payable on death
provision was seen in Redfield.232 In Redfield, Edwin and Esther were
married in 1949.233 Edwin entered the nursing home in 1992 and qualified
for Medicaid in 1995.234 Between 1995 and 1997, Edwin received over
$100,000 in Medicaid benefits.235 During this time, Esther owned two
$25,000 certificates of deposit with payable on death provisions favoring
her three children.2 36 Esther died on July 12, 1997, and Edwin died on
November 19, 1997.237 In an attempt to recover the certificates of deposit,
the state filed a claim against Esther's estate for the cost of Medicaid
expended on Edwin's behalf.238
The district court held in part that the state could not recover because
there was no evidence that Edwin ever had a beneficial interest in the cer-
tificates of deposit.2 39 Edwin's name was not on the certificates, nor had he
ever been a party to the instruments. 240 Although Redfield was primarily
decided on other grounds, it appears that an instrument owned by the
community spouse with payable on death provisions in favor of someone
other than the Medicaid recipient may be too attenuated to permit tracing
and estate recovery measures. 24 1
trusts that have been established by third parties to benefit the Medicaid recipient as long as the
trustee has complete discretion to make distributions from the trust for the benefit of the Medicaid
recipient. Id.
230. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459 (7th ed. 1999).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).






238. Id. 5 3, 620 N.W.2d at 572.
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A trust involves property transferred by one individual (the settlor) to
another (the trustee) to administer for the benefit of a third person (the
beneficiary).242 According to OBRA, the "estate," for recovery purposes,
may include "assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased
individual through... living trust, or other arrangement." 243
In Belshe v. Hope,244 the California Court of Appeals examined the
extent to which an interest in a trust may be recovered to repay Medicaid
benefits. 245 In Belshe, Hope executed a revocable inter vivos trust and
conveyed assets to the trust consisting of a one-half interest in her real
property. 246 Hope retained the use and benefit of the property for her
lifetime, and upon her death, the trust property was to be conveyed to her
husband or her four children if he predeceased her.247 Hope received
Medicaid benefits exceeding $290,000 from 1987 until her death in 1992.248
The state filed a claim against Hope's estate, including the assets
contained within the trust.24 9 The estate claimed that the trust property was
not within Hope's estate, and therefore, not recoverable. 250 The state
argued that the trust property remained in Hope's estate because the trust
was invalid, the trust was testamentary, and property that passes by way of
a revocable inter vivos trust is considered within the estate for purposes of
the state recovery statute.251 The lower court found for the state on all three
bases and held that the trust property remained in the estate and was
therefore recoverable. 252
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed, but not on the
same basis the lower court articulated.253 Rather, the court stated that reso-
lution of the case involved an interpretation of whether Congress intended
to include nonprobate transfers when it defined "estate" in OBRA.254 The
242. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (7th ed. 1999).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). A decedent's property interest in
an inter vivos trust ends at death, and the rights to the property are thereafter governed by the
terms of the trust. Buchholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 1997).
244. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917 (Ct. App. Cal. 1995).
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251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 926.
254. Id. at 923.
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court found that Congress intended "estate" to have a broad meaning, and
that under this broad meaning, states could recover both probate and non-
probate transfers, including an interest in property that passes to a trust
outside of the probate estate. 255 Thus, the issue addressed by the court was
not whether the trust property remained in Hope's estate, but whether the
state defined "estate" broadly enough to include property that passed
outside of the estate. 256
5. Other Arrangements and Tracing
OBRA states that "estate," for purposes of recovery, may include
"assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through ... other arrangement."257 The types of transfers or interests that
constitute an "other arrangement" are unclear from the statutory lan-
guage. 258 In In re Estate of Wirtz,259 the North Dakota Supreme Court at-
tempted to define the types of property interests that could constitute "other
arrangements" under OBRA.260
In Wirtz, Clarence and Verna were married in 1943.261 In 1996, Clar-
ence began receiving Medicaid benefits to pay for his nursing home costs,
which he continued to receive until his death in 1997.262 Verna died in
1998.263 The NDDHS filed a claim against Verna's estate for Medicaid
benefits paid on Clarence's behalf.264 After the claim was disallowed, the
NDDHS petitioned the court for allowance, arguing that "Verna['s] entire
estate was subject to recovery because Clarence had a marital or equitable
interest in all of her property at his time of death."265 The trial court denied
the NDDHS's claim, stating that Clarence had no legal title or interest in
any of the property in Verna's estate when he died.266
On appeal, the NDDHS argued that OBRA allowed recovery of equi-
table interests, marital interests, homestead interests, and interests in the
surviving spouse's obligation to pay for the recipient's medical expenses as
255. Id. at 926.
256. Id.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
258. Id.
259. 2000 ND 59,607 N.W.2d 882.
260. Wirtz, 5 3, 607 N.W.2d at 883.
261. Id. T 2.
262. Id.






a necessary. 267 The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the
NDDHS's argument hinged on whether it could show that these interests
fell under the term "other arrangement" as provided in OBRA.268 The court
recognized that an "other arrangement" under OBRA could include a
homestead interest, a community property interest, or other assets in which
Clarence had legal title to or an interest in at his death.269 However, in
order to trace and recover these assets from the community spouse's estate,
the NDDHS was required to show that the Medicaid recipient had an
interest and conveyed some of the interest in the property during the course
of the marriage. 270 The court required the NDDHS to show some type of
connection between the property in the estate of the community spouse and
the recipient. 27' A marital interest or equitable interest in the surviving
spouse's separately-owned property was not sufficient to subject the
property interest to tracing under North Dakota's estate recovery
program. 272
In In re Estate of Gullberg,273 a recent case from Minnesota, a further
attempt was made at refining what types of property transfers and interests
constitute an "other arrangement" under OBRA.274 Here, Jean and Walter
Gullberg purchased their homestead in 1983 as joint tenants.275 Shortly
before applying for Medicaid, Walter conveyed his interest in the home-
stead to Jean. 276 Walter received Medicaid until his death in 1994, and Jean
passed away six years later.277 The Minnesota Department of Human Ser-
vices (MDHS) implemented estate recovery measures against the home-
stead, the only asset in Jean's estate. 278 After the claim was disallowed, the
267. Id. 1 4. In at least one state, if a responsible relative refuses to pay for necessary
medical care, the furnishing of such care by the state creates an implied contract between the state
and the relative so that the cost may be recovered by the state. Comm'r of Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Spellman, 672 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
268. In re Estate of Wirtz, 2000 ND 59, 5 10, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885.
269. Id. 5 12.
270. Id. 5 14, 607 N.W.2d at 886.
271. Id.
272. Id. A community property interest in the estate of the surviving spouse was found to be
traceable and recoverable in a case from Idaho. In re Estate of Knudson, 970 P.2d 6, 9 (Idaho
1998). An interesting development from Knudson was the court's finding that any assets trans-
ferred prior to the OBRA's enactment in 1993 could not be considered "other assets" for purposes
of estate recovery. Id.
273. 652 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
274. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 713.
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MDHS brought suit in district court.279 The district court held that the
MDHS was not entitled to recover from assets that were conveyed prior to
the recipient's death because OBRA permits recovery only from property in
which the recipient had legal title "at the time of death." 280 The district
court held that Minnesota's estate recovery statute was preempted because
it impermissibly broadened the scope of OBRA by permitting recovery
from any assets that were jointly owned at any time during the marriage. 281
On appeal, the court affirmed the preemption of Minnesota's statute,
but remanded the case to re-evaluate Walter's interest in the homestead. 282
Although Walter had conveyed legal title in the homestead to his wife in
1992, the court stated he continued to have "some legal interest" in the
homestead by virtue of his marriage to Jean, the title owner when he
died.283 The court concluded that the state could pursue recovery against
the homestead, but "only to the extent of the value of the recipient's interest
in the homestead at the time of the recipient's death."284 According to
Gullberg, the MDHS was entitled to recovery, but only to the extent that the
district court could place a monetary value on Walter's marital interest in
the homestead property. 285
V. RATIONALE FOR AND AGAINST ESTATE RECOVERY
A. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS AGGRESSIVE ESTATE RECOVERY
MEASURES
A majority of courts that have ruled on this issue have agreed that the
broad purpose of OBRA is to provide states with a means to use estate
recovery to replenish Medicaid funds and provide for future benefits.286 In
279. Id.
280. Id. at 712. OBRA permits recovery from "any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest in at the time of death." 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000).
281. In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). Minnesota's
estate recovery statute allowed claims against the estate "to the value of the assets of the estate
that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." Id. at 713
(emphasis added).
282. Id. at 714-15.
283. Id. at 713. The court explained that the law recognizes the common ownership interests
that spouses have over property acquired during a marriage. Id. (citing Searles v. Searles, 420
N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1988)). The court also indicated that Walter's interest in the homestead
property could derive from the homestead interest that descended to the surviving spouse. Id.
284. Id. at 714.
285. Id.
286. Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Ct. App. Cal. 1995); In re Estate of Jobe,




Belshe, the California Court of Appeals stated that the broad purpose of
providing for the medical care of the needy was furthered by allowing states
to replenish their Medicaid funds from the estates of former recipients. 287
Belshe was quoted with approval by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Thompson.28
8
B. ESTATE RECOVERY IS CONTRARY TO ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
In order to become eligible for Medicaid, a recipient must meet certain
eligibility requirements. 289 Often, this requires Medicaid applicants to
spend down assets to within allowable limits. 290 Any remaining assets are
either exempt, excluded, or within the asset limits established by the
program.29' Often, the home is the only significant asset remaining in the
estate of a Medicaid recipient or a recipient's surviving spouse.292
In Medicaid cases approved under the spousal impoverishment
provisions, community spouses are allowed to have a significantly higher
level of assets and still qualify their spouses for Medicaid.293 These spousal
protections were included under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 and were designed to "end the pauperization" of community spouses
by allowing them to preserve a higher level of assets to meet their own
needs when their spouses require nursing home care. 294 Once allocations
and spend-downs are made and Medicaid eligibility is achieved, any
remaining assets are considered unavailable to meet the costs of medical
care. 295 Imposing estate recovery on these remaining assets is contrary to
the asset allocation and spend-down provisions of federal and state law. 296
287. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
288. Thompson, 5 14, 586 N.W.2d at 851.
289. Larson & Hauer, supra note 24, at 202-03.
290. Id.
291. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-27-28 (2001); see also Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 166
(arguing that allowing claims against the estates of surviving spouses is contrary to the asset
allocation and spend-down provisions of both federal and state law).
292. West Virginia v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 284-85 (4th Cir.
2002); Fish & WanderPolo, supra note 64, at 1. The Medicaid recipient may retain the homestead
because it is not included in the eligibility determination. Fish & WanderPolo, supra note 64, at 1.
It is only when the homestead remains in the estate that there are sufficient assets to repay the
Medicaid claim. Id.
293. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-24; N.D. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 31, §
510-05-65-20(1).
294. Estate of Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. 1997).
295. Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 166.
296. Id.
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To further impose estate recovery on the assets that remain at death has
been referred to by one author as "picking the bones of the poor."297
However, the rules of eligibility for Medicaid do not necessarily need
to correlate with the rules of estate recovery. 298 Because recovery is only
permissible after the death of an individual's surviving spouse, "dual inter-
ests are served" through the estate recovery process. 299 Surviving spouses
are permitted to have sufficient assets during their lifetime, and states are
permitted to replenish their Medicaid program funds when surviving
spouses die.300
VI. SPECIAL QUESTIONS
A. How FAR DID CONGRESS REALLY WANT TO Go?
One consideration is whether states are interpreting OBRA more
broadly than was originally intended by Congress. The personal represen-
tative in Thompson argued that the language of OBRA was not the language
that was originally proposed in the OBRA legislation. 301 He argued that the
original House version of the bill indicated that Congress did not intend to
allow recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse of a Medicaid
recipient.302 The court made short shrift of this argument, stating that "pub-
lic policy is declared by the action of the legislature not by its failure to act"
and that OBRA, as written, clearly permitted such recovery. 303
B. Is FORCED ESTATE RECOVERY CONSTITUTIONAL?
Another question is whether forced estate recovery is constitutional.
Not all states have embraced estate recovery, and at least one state, West
Virginia, went to great lengths to avoid implementing estate recovery at
all. 304 In West Virginia v. Department of Health & Human Services,305 the
state brought an action against the federal government, alleging that forced
estate recovery was unconstitutional because it was unduly coercive in
297. See Bookbinder, supra note 68, at 34 (discussing an article written by attorney Charles
P. Sabatino of the American Bar Association Commission on the Legal Problems of the Elderly
and published by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys).
298. Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 166.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. In re Estate of Thompson, 1998 ND 226, 5J 13,586 N.W.2d 847, 851.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. West Virginia v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 283-84 (4th Cir.
2002).
305. 289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
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violation of the Tenth Amendment.306 The state argued that estate recovery
was "bad public policy" that yielded little in financial benefit and created
significant problems for the state's citizens, such as widespread depression
in aged and disabled nursing home residents.307
Although the federal government argued that the state could simply
choose not to comply, West Virginia faced the loss of federal Medicaid
funds and the collapse of its program if it failed to follow the federal man-
dates regarding estate recovery. 308 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that generally the federal government could use its spending
power to induce states to comply with federal programs. 309 However, in
some circumstances, the financial inducement to comply may be so coer-
cive as to "pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion." 310
According to the court, if the government withheld all federal funds because
of West Virginia's failure to implement an estate recovery program, the
federal action would be unconstitutional. 31' Because the federal govern-
ment had the option of withholding all of the federal payments or only that
portion related to individuals who were subject to estate recovery, its
mandate survived West Virginia's constitutional challenge. 312
C. ARE THERE BETTER ALTERNATIVES?
1. Better Use of the Hardship Provision
OBRA directs states to define certain hardship conditions under which
the state will forego estate recovery. 313 If the decision in Dalzin is correct,
these hardship provisions are a supplement to and not a replacement for
306. West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 283-84, 287. "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the State, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
307. West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 285. The average estate recovery claim in West Virginia is
approximately $50,000, although the state is only able to recover an average of $14,000 from the
estate of each recipient or recipient's spouse. Id.
308. Id. at 287. Many West Virginians were poor and receiving Medicaid. Id.
309. Id. at 286.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 291-92.
312. Id. The court held it could not assume that the federal government would have imposed
the maximum punishment. Id. Because the federal government retained discretion to impose only
part of the penalty, West Virginia could not establish that the federal mandate was coercive and a
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id.
313. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3) (2000); Dalzin v. Belshe, 993 F. Supp. 732, 735 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
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those exemptions already included under OBRA. 314 Thus, states can
already provide relief from estate recovery by defining a broader range of
circumstances under which undue hardship would be granted and recovery
waived.315
According to the HCFA, appropriate circumstances for granting an
undue hardship waiver could include situations where the property subject
to recovery is: (1) the sole income producing asset of the survivors, (2) a
homestead of modest value, or (3) other compelling circumstances.
316
Although the HCFA recommendations seem to indicate that states will have
considerable flexibility in defining what constitutes an undue hardship,
there is no guarantee that the federal government will agree.317 West
Virginia recently sought approval for a Medicaid plan amendment that
would permit the state to forego estate recovery on many homes based on
the undue hardship waiver.318 Although "a homestead of modest value"
was one of the criteria suggested by the HCFA, West Virginia's request for
modification was denied. 319
States could choose to make hardship waiver decisions on a case-by-
case basis. However, this has the unfortunate result of making recipients
guess whether they will qualify. 320 On the other hand, a specific list of
hardship conditions could narrow the scope of when undue hardship would
be granted. 32' Exactly how to proceed is not clear. Nonetheless, states
should consider whether the use of the undue hardship waiver is an
appropriate means to provide relief to their citizens.
2. Foregoing Recovery on Small Estates
Another option is to forego estate recovery completely on estates with
modest value. In West Virginia's constitutional appeal, it indicated that the
average estate recovery claim in the state was approximately $50,000, but
the average amount actually collected was only $14,000.322 Although the
314. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3). The federal statute already provides for a waiver of estate
recovery measures when the deceased recipient is survived by a spouse, a disabled child, or a
child under the age of twenty-one. Id. § 1396p(b)(2).
315. Id. § 1396p(b)(3). States continue to struggle in defining undue hardship and in
determining what procedures to apply for a hardship waiver. Estate of Schiola v. Colo. Dep't of
Heath Care Financing & Policy, 51 P.3d 1080, 1081 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
316. In re Estate of Cox, 687 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
317. National Center on Care-giving, West Virginia Fights Medicaid Estate Recovery Provi-
sion (May 7, 2002), available at http://www.caregiver.org/pd/policy-digest-vol-2-issue7C. html.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Cox, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
321. Id.
322. West Virginia v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2002).
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$14,000 recovery may not mean much to the state after the costs of recov-
ery are factored in, this small estate means substantially more to the elderly
citizens of West Virginia, who struggle with a significant rate of poverty.323
Moreover, exempting small estates from Medicaid recovery is consistent
with the inherent need we all have to leave something of value behind to
those that we love.
3. Foregoing Recovery on the Homestead
Because the home may be an exempt asset for Medicaid eligibility,
oftentimes it is the only significant asset remaining in the estates of
Medicaid recipients and their spouses. 324 The family home, with its special
ties to family and community, is an especially painful asset to subject to the
rigors of Medicaid estate recovery. 325 One way to minimize the impact of
estate recovery would be to exempt the homestead from recovery by
recognizing that recovery of the home constitutes an undue hardship to the
surviving family.
VII. THE FUTURE OF ESTATE RECOVERY
Since OBRA's inception, some states have been dissatisfied with its
mandates. 326 OBRA provisions are seen as ambiguous and confusing. 327 In
particular, the failure to provide some guidance regarding the practical
application of an expanded definition of "estate" leaves many shaking their
heads in frustration. 328 Additionally, critics have been concerned about
OBRA's impact on title transfers and commercial transactions.3 29 Senators
from New Jersey attempted to mediate the effects of OBRA by proposing
323. Id. at 287. The Governor of West Virginia filed a plan with HCFA to exempt the first
$50,000 from estate recovery. Suzanne E. Messenger, Esq., Medicaid Estate Recovery: The
Mystery Revealed, W.V. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 8, 9. If approved, the plan would dramatically
reduce the number of estates subject to recovery. Id.
324. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-27(1) (2001).
325. See Jeffreys, supra note 6, at 835.
326. See supra Part IV.B; Peter J. Strauss, New York's New Medicaid Statute, N.Y. L.J., June
29, 1994, at 3.
327. Strauss, supra note 326, at 3. According to this author, not even the Senate and House
committee staffers who helped write the OBRA amendment could explain what the language
meant. Id.
328. Id. OBRA authorizes recovery from an interest in joint tenancy property that passes to
a survivor or heir at death. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2000). The obvious question is "[w]hat
property interest does a decedent have in joint property at the time of death?" Strauss, supra note
326, at 3. Another author wrote "the federal statute appears to contradict itself by authorizing
post-mortem recovery from estate interests which in fact no longer exist." Fish & WanderPolo,
supra note 64, at 1.
329. Sharon A. Balsamo, Esq., Legislation Addresses Medicaid Estate Recovery Rules, N.J.
LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 9, 1998, at 2633.
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an amendment that would limit estate recovery to the probate estate. 330
Nonetheless, Medicaid estate recovery under OBRA continues to be an im-
portant issue for those who are receiving or planning to apply for Medicaid.
VIII. CONCLUSION
America's elderly will be living longer and with more chronic illnesses
as the aging of our society continues. 33' Many of these individuals will
eventually require nursing home care, but few will have the necessary
insurance coverage to pay for the costs. 332 Consequently, a large majority
of these citizens will be forced to rely on Medicaid in order to pay for the
costs of their care. 333 In order to obtain Medicaid eligibility to pay for
nursing home care, individuals must meet certain asset and income
requirements. 334 Although couples with one spouse in the community are
allowed a higher asset limit, the only significant asset in the estate of most
Medicaid recipients or their spouse is the marital home.335
Since OBRA was enacted in 1993, states have been required to
implement estate recovery programs.336 Although OBRA permits states to
pursue only assets that are included in an individual's probate estate, it also
permits states to choose a more aggressive recovery program by including
assets that pass outside of the probate estate.337 Conflicts arise primarily
because, under common law, the interest in nonprobate transfers, such as
joint tenancy, life estate interests, and trusts, vanish upon the death of the
transferor. 338
Most states have interpreted OBRA as allowing them to trace and
recover assets that were once owned by the recipient spouse from the estate
of the surviving spouse.339 Nonetheless, states continue to struggle with
how far tracing under estate recovery can go. 340 Courts have evaluated
what the recipient's interest in the property was at death, whether marital
and equitable interests are sufficient to apply tracing, and whether
330. Id.
331. See supra Part II.C.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See supra Part lI.B.
335. See supra Parts Il.B, D.
336. See supra Part HI.A.
337. See supra Part III.B.





connections to the property, such as a power to revoke, improve the ability
of states to trace assets into the estates of the surviving spouses.34'
Medicaid estate recovery presents a hardship to many Medicaid recipi-
ents, most of whom have little left in their estates to recover from except the
family home.342 Moreover, the benefits of estate recovery may not be as
great as it seems after costs of recovery and litigation are considered. 343
States do have some recourse in lessening the burden that estate recov-
ery imposes on its citizens. 344 States are required to define circumstances
that can constitute an undue hardship, and then forego estate recovery when
these circumstances occur. 345 By providing a broader definition of undue
hardship, including an exemption for the home and smaller estates, states
are still able to recover where recovery is beneficial to the program, while at
the same time leaving the estates of the poorest of the poor intact.346
Janel C. Frank*
341. Id.
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